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SHIP-MONEY: THE CASE THAT TIME AND 
WHITTINGTON FORGOT 
REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS 
OF CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE 
PRESENT. By Keith E. Whittington.1 University Press of 
Kansas. 2019. Pp. xxi + 410. $39.95 (Cloth). 
Mark A. Graber2 
King Charles I, when asking the King’s Bench for an opinion 
on whether the king during an emergency could insist that all 
communities in England supply the Royal Navy with a ship or the 
money necessary to build a ship,3 set in motion a process that 
delayed the development of judicial review in the English-
speaking world for more than a century. The King’s Bench 
informed the King that he had the power to levy that exaction.4 
Several years later, in the Ship Money Case or The King v. 
Hampden, the justices by an 8–4 vote declared the levy 
constitutional. Three justices issued opinions quite clearly 
affirming judicial power to strike down any Parliamentary statute 
that trenched on the royal prerogative. Neither that decision nor 
the assertions of judicial power proved lasting in England or the 
United Kingdom. When Parliament reconvened in 1640, the Ship 
Money decision was condemned.5 During the English Civil War, 
the surviving justices in the majority who did not flee the realm 
were imprisoned.6 By the end of the seventeenth century, 
parliamentary supremacy was becoming the law of the land. 
Aided by Blackstone’s Commentaries, commentators soon 
 
 1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Princeton University.  
 2. Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. 
 3. See The King v. Hampdon (1637) 3, HOWELL’S STATE TRIALS 825, 844 (U.K.). 
 4. See id. at 844. 
 5. See id. at 1261, 1299. 
 6. For the information in this paragraph, see W. J. JONES, POLITICS AND THE 
BENCH: THE JUDGES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR (1971); STUART E. 
PRALL, BOOK REVIEW, 78 THE AM. HIST. REV. 432 (1973).  
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forgot the political struggles over the judiciary in the seventeenth 
century that placed England on the course of parliamentary 
supremacy. When scholars look for the English origins of judicial 
review, they debate the significance of Dr. Bonham’s Case.7 Ship-
Money is almost entirely absent from the judicial review canon, 
even from works as magnificently encyclopedic as Keith 
Whittington’s Repugnant Laws: Judicial Review of Acts of 
Congress from the Founding to the Present.8 Repugnant Laws tells 
the conventional story of the rise of judicial power in the United 
States. Professor Keith Whittington goes directly from Bonham 
to the late 1760s, when some colonialists claimed that courts 
should declare unconstitutional laws permitting English 
authorities to use general warrants and when William Blackstone 
published Commentaries on the Laws of England,9 the second 
volume of which maintained that courts had no power to declare 
laws unconstitutional (p. 40). The English Civil War had a great 
impact on King Charles I’s head, but apparently none on judicial 
power. 
Whittington’s failure to mention Ship-Money in his 
magisterial Repugnant Laws highlights the present obscurity of 
the case. Whittington, when writing Repugnant Laws, performed 
Herculean research tasks. He read and synthesized every case in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States considered 
declaring unconstitutional a federal law. The text comments on 
the Supreme Court’s greatest hits and on every federal 
constitutional matter in which a justice ever hit a note. Repugnant 
Laws discusses Marbury v. Madison10 (pp. 80–82), as well as scores 
of other cases, such as Pollard v. Hagan11 (pp. 98–100), that 
escaped the notice of almost all scholars previous to Whittington. 
This is not simply an exercise in judicial trivial pursuit. 
Whittington demonstrates such cases as Hagan play as vital role 
in understanding the development and role of judicial review as 
Marbury. If Ship-Money is missing from this study, that case and 
 
 7. 77 ENG. REP. 646 (C.P. 1610). For the debates over the significance of Bonham’s 
Case, see especially, R. M. Helmholtz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review and the Law of 
Nature, 1 J.LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 326 note 3 (2009) (citing numerous sources discussing 
Bonham and the origins of judicial review). 
 8. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, REPUGNANT LAWS: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTS OF 
CONGRESS FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT (2019). 
 9. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1979). 
 10. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 11. 44 U.S. 212 (1845). 
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the surrounding constitutional politics are likely to be absent from 
any history of judicial review in the English-speaking world, past, 
present, or future. 
This Review employs a bait and switch strategy for restoring 
Ship-Money to the canon on judicial review that Whittington so 
lovingly fills out with respect to the United States. The bait is an 
alleged review of a seminal manuscript by one of the most 
prominent constitutional scholars in the academy. The switch is a 
focus on a neglected case in the English canon of judicial power 
rather than a discussion of what Whittington has to say about the 
canon in the United States. This bait and switch strategy is 
justified by the sheer impossibility of saying anything new or 
particularly interesting about the history of judicial review that 
Whittington has not covered. 
Repugnant Laws is immune to the standard review critique. 
The review of cases is dimensionally more comprehensive than 
has ever occurred before. One might tinker at the margins with a 
case or theme here and there, but any proposed addition, 
subtraction, or modification is likely to take place at least six 
points to the right of the decimal place. Historical institutionalists 
can add little to Repugnant Laws’ central thesis, that one cannot 
understand the work of the Supreme Court without a deep 
engagement with the law and politics of the time. This 
understanding that judicial review is politically constructed is 
becoming increasingly important in both political science 
departments and law schools.12 Repugnant Laws documents how 
courts are political institutions. Whittington writes: 
The Court has not stood apart from the forces that move 
American politics generally. The justices swim in the same 
political waters as other federal government officials. The 
Court acts within bounds set by other political actors, and it 
acts on goals shared by its political allies (p. 287). 
Repugnant Laws details how the Supreme Court is a distinctive 
political institution that does not merely reproduce the rest of the 
political order. Whittington observes, 
The justices . . . are not minions who simply do the bidding of 
party leaders. They are allies of coalitional leaders, not their 
agents . . . . [Their] commitments may well be shared by others, 
 
 12. For one review of the literature, see Mark A. Graber, The Collapse of the New 
Deal Conceptual Universe: The Schmooze Project, 77 MD. L. REV. 108, 121–25 (2017). 
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and they may be advanced through party platforms and 
legislative debates, but the justices give them shape and 
effectiveness. The justices set their own priorities and, in many 
cases, have their own distinctive set of concerns (pp. 288–89). 
Whether any scholar could state these points more clearly or 
defend them with more vigor and elbow grease is doubtful. For 
this reason, the better reviewing strategy is to make this barely 
adequate feint in Whittington’s direction and then use the body 
of the review to discuss a related subject of interest to the 
reviewer. 
The absence of Ship-Money from the canon of judicial review 
creates a lacuna in the scholarship on the theoretical foundations 
for judicial review. Part I of this Review briefly covers the facts of 
Ship-Money, the holding of the case, the majority opinions clearly 
asserting a judicial power to declare unconstitutional 
parliamentary laws, and the dissenting opinions clearly asserting 
a judicial power to declare illegal royal proclamations. Part II of 
this Review details how those majority and dissenting opinions 
provided Americans with two distinctive paths to a judicial power 
to declare laws unconstitutional. The majority opinions 
emphasized sovereignty. Judicial review serves to protect the will 
of the sovereign, be that the King, Parliament, or the people. The 
dissents emphasized fundamental law. Judicial review serves to 
protect higher law principles. Marbury grounded judicial review 
in a theory of sovereignty. James Otis, when protesting the Stamp 
Act13, grounded judicial review in higher law principles. Both 
approaches intertwine in American constitutional development. 
The absence of Ship-Money from the canon of judicial review 
creates a lacuna in the scholarship on the political construction of 
judicial review. Increasing agreement exists among scholars of 
constitutional law in the United States that judicial review has 
political foundations and is not the countermajoritarian 
institution that Alexander Bickel and other scholars obsessed 
about in the late twentieth century.14 Ran Hirschl and Tom 
Ginsburg detail how the judicialization of politics outside the 
United States has similar political foundations.15 Talk of politics 
 
13. Public Act, 5 George III, c. 12. 
14  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 15. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL 
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disappears, however, when conversation turns to the rise of 
parliamentary sovereignty in England. Repugnant Laws and other 
distinguished histories begin with Bonham’s Case, which scholars 
discuss as an intervention in the theory of judicial power. The 
English path ends with Blackstone declaring that courts have no 
power to declare laws unconstitutional. Parliamentary 
sovereignty appears to have just happened in England, or 
Bonham perhaps aside, been the rule from time immemorial. No 
politics here. 
Ship-Money puts politics back into explanations for the rise 
of parliamentary sovereignty in England and the later rise of 
judicial power in the United States. The judicial opinions in Ship-
Money demonstrate that judicial elites in the mid-seventeenth 
century had developed a conception of judicial power rooted in 
royal sovereignty that justified striking down parliamentary 
legislation inconsistent with royal prerogatives. Part III of this 
Essay explains why this conception of judicial power did not take 
hold in England. The political foundations of Ship-Money judicial 
review collapsed almost immediately. The judicial majority in 
Ship-Money placed the courts firmly on what would become, 
within a decade, the losing side of the English Civil War, when 
asserting that sovereignty was vested in the King, that one aspect 
of this sovereignty was royal power to levy exactions without 
parliamentary consent, and that laws that trenched on this regal 
prerogative were void. Institutional power after 1648 and 1688 
flowed to Parliament, the institution on the winning side of the 
English revolution. The new understanding of judicial power, 
celebrated by Blackstone, maintained that courts could not strike 
down legislation because Parliament was sovereign, but that 
justices could declare illegal Royal decrees inconsistent with 
parliamentary sovereignty. Ultra vires judicial power and only 
ultra vires judicial power does not date from “time immemorial,” 
but became during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries the dominant philosophy of the members of Parliament 
who gained power after the English Civil War and the Glorious 
Revolution. 
John Marshall learned well the lesson Ship-Money taught 
about judicial capacity to intervene in bitter political disputes. 
Marshall in Marbury and in other cases avoided making decisions 
 
REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003). 
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that unduly antagonized the dominant national coalition.16 
Marshall might have engaged in considerable strategic voting 
simply because he was an astute politician. Given the centrality of 
the English Civil War to colonial revolutionaries,17 however, the 
fate of the English justices and tribunals that decided Ship-Money 
probably explains at least in part Marshall’s reticence to challenge 
Jeffersonian constitutional presumptions until supporters of a 
Federalist/National Republic/Whig program had greater 
influence in the national government.18 
I. THE CASE 
Ship-Money arose out of the quarrels between King Charles 
I and Parliament that precipitated the English Civil War.19 
Charles I dissolved Parliament in 1629 because he believed 
members were intruding on the Royal prerogative. This decision 
proved problematic. The main source of royal funding was the 
subsidy, which could only be voted on by Parliament. In 1634, 
Charles attempted to do a workabout by claiming the kingdom 
was threatened by pirates and other nations in ways that made 
necessary a demand that landowners supply the royal treasury 
with the money to build ships. John Hampden and other 
prominent political actors refused to pay the tax. They were 
arrested and brought before the combined King’s Bench and 
Court of Exchequer. 
The special tribunal sustained the royal levy by an 8–4 vote. 
Although nine of the twelve justices in their seriatim opinions 
maintained that such exactions were constitutional, Sir Humphrey 
Davenport voted against conviction because of a technical defect 
in the writ. The primary issue before the court was whether the 
King had acted legally. In declaring the Ship-Money levy illegal, 
the dissenting justices implicitly or explicitly took the position that 
 
 16. See Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and 
Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were 
the ‘Great’ Marshall Court Decisions, 87 VA . L. REV. 1111 (2001); Jack Knight & Lee 
Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 87, 95 (1996). 
 17. See KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE COUSINS’ WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS, CIVIL 
WARFARE, AND THE TRIUMPH OF ANGLO-AMERICA (1999). 
 18. See Graber, supra note 12; Klarman, supra note 16. 
 19. For the information in this paragraph and a good background on English 
constitutional politics in the seventeenth century, see 1 MARK A. GRABER & HOWARD 
GILLMAN, THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2015); CHRISTOPHER 
HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603–1714 (1961). 
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courts of law could find that the King had acted illegally. The 
justices were not compelled to rule on whether courts could 
maintain Parliament had acted illegally. Parliament, being 
dissolved, had not acted at all. Nevertheless, at least three 
opinions made clear that, had Parliament attempted to interfere 
with the King’s effort to raise money to defend the kingdom, the 
justices would have declared that effort illegal. 
The central conclusion of the majority opinions, as expressed 
in a previous letter to the King when Charles I asked for an 
advisory opinion, was that “when the good and safety of the 
kingdom in general is concerned . . . , your majesty is the sole 
judge of the danger, and when and how the same is to be 
prevented and avoided.”20 The King was authorized to determine 
whether the realm was imperiled. Sir John Finch maintained, “the 
king is sole judge of the danger, and whether it be imminent.”21 
“[T]he danger being certified by his majesty,” Sir Humphrey 
Davenport asserted, “I hold it not traversable.”22 Once the King 
determined the realm was imperiled, the King was authorized to 
adopt whatever means would best defend the realm. Some justices 
grounded this conclusion in pragmatism. Sir Francis Weston 
stated, “Will you have forces on both sides, and restrain the king 
to his power by parliament, which may be so dilatory, that the 
kingdom may be lost in the mean time?”23 The more common 
claim was that royal power was rooted in sovereignty. Sir Robert 
Berkley spoke of the “regal power to command provision (in case 
of necessity) of means from the subjects, to be adjoined to the 
king’s own means for the defense of the commonwealth.”24 
These royal powers could not be controlled by Parliament. 
Although Parliament had not passed a statute forbidding the 
Ship-Money levy, several opinions by justices in the majority 
made clear that courts would declare such a measure illegal. Finch 
described at length the constitutional limits on parliamentary 
efforts to tame royal power. 
Acts of parliament may take away flowers and ornaments of 
the crown, but not the crown itself; they cannot bar a 
succession, nor can they be attained by them, and acts that bar 
 
 20. In the Case of Ship-Money, 3 Howell’s State Trials at 844. 
 21. Id. at 1219 (opinion of Finch, J.). 
 22. Id. at 1213 (opinion of Davenport, J.). 
 23. Id. at 1075 (opinion of Weston, J.). 
 24. Id. at 1099 (opinion of Berkley, J.). 
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them or possession are void. No act of parliament can bar a 
king of his regality, as that no lands should hold of him; or bar 
him of the allegiance of his subjects; or the relative on his part, 
as trust and power to defend his people: therefore acts of 
parliament to take away his royal power in the defence of his 
kingdom, are void . . . ; they are void acts of parliament, to bind 
the kind not to command the subjects, their persons and goods, 
and I say their money too: for no acts of parliament make any 
difference.25 
Two justices explicitly agreed with this declaration of 
constitutional limits on parliamentary power to interfere with 
regal prerogatives. Davenport wrote, “if an act of parliament 
should be made to restrain such a charge on the subjects in case 
of necessity, it would be felo de se, and so void, for it would destroy 
the regalejus.”26 Sir George Vernon insisted, “a statute derogatory 
from the prerogative doth not bind the king; and the king may 
dispense with any law in cases of necessity.”27 No other majority 
opinion discussed the status of laws that trenched on the royal 
sovereignty, but other justices made assertions of royal power, 
connected with sovereignty, that implicitly indicated that 
parliament did not have the unlimited lawmaking authority that 
Blackstone celebrated a century later. Sir Robert Berkley 
described Parliament as “but a Concilium . . . ; the king may call 
it, prorogue it, dissolve it, at his pleasure; and whatsoever the king 
doth therein, is always to be taken as just and necessary.”28 
The three justices who maintained the tax was illegal did not 
rely on Blackstonian notions of parliamentary sovereignty. Those 
dissents were guided by the principle that the king lacked the 
specific power to tax without an act of Parliament. Sir George 
Crooke maintained, “It is against the common law of the land, 
which gives a man a freedom and property in his goods and 
estates, that it cannot be taken from him, but by his consent in 
specie, as in parliament, or by his particular assent.”29 Sir John 
Denham agreed that “The king’s majesty being of a corporate 
capacity, can neither take any lands or goods from any of his 
subjects, but by and upon a judgment on record.”30 No judge in 
 
 25. Id. at 1235 (opinion of Finch, J.). 
 26. Id. at 1215 (opinion of Davenport, J.). 
 27. Id. at 1125 (opinion of Berkley, J.). 
 28. Id. at 1101 (opinion of Hutton, J.). 
 29. Id. at 1129 (opinion of Crooke, J.). 
 30. Id. at 1201 (opinion of Denham, J.). 
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the dissent asserted a more general parliamentary supremacy. Sir 
Richard Hutton, after observing that “this power of assessing of 
money, being a great charge, cannot by the law at this day, unless 
in time of actual war, be imposed upon the people [but] by act of 
parliament,”31 then insisted that Parliament was not omniscient. 
He continued, “if an act of parliament should enact that he should 
not defend the kingdom, that the king should have no aid from his 
subjects to defend the kingdom, these acts would not bind, 
because they would be against natural reason.”32 
The opinions in Ship-Money demonstrate that Blackstone’s 
Commentaries described practice in mid-eighteenth century 
England and not time-honored practices or even the practice 
before the English Civil War. The justices in the majority that 
discussed judicial review located sovereignty in the King. They 
asserted a power to ignore legislation inconsistent with that 
sovereignty. The justices in the dissent, less clearly, indicated that 
the Common Law had devised a line between royal power and 
parliamentary power. Parliament was supreme within that limited 
jurisdiction. A royal edict that taxed people was an illegal 
intrusion on parliamentary power (not sovereignty) and could be 
so declared by the courts. For the same reasons, the dissenting 
opinions indicated that Parliament, in turn, could not trench on 
matters the Common Law entrusted to the King, such as the 
defense of the kingdom in real emergencies. 
II. SHIP-MONEY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Ship-Money offers interesting variations on and an 
alternative to the connection between judicial power and 
sovereignty. Judicial review in the United States, Whittington 
notes, was initially grounded in the notion that the people are 
sovereign. The lack of judicial review in the United Kingdom, 
Blackstone points out, is grounded in the notion that Parliament 
is sovereign (p. 41). The justices in the Ship-Money majority who 
declared that courts could ignore laws inconsistent with the royal 
prerogative grounded judicial authority in the notion that the 
King was sovereign. The justices who believed the King had acted 
illegally, by comparison, did not ground judicial authority on 
parliamentary sovereignty or any other notion of sovereignty. 
 
 31. Id. at 1191 (opinion of Hutton, J.). 
 32. Id. at 1195 (opinion of Hutton, J.). 
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Instead, they emphasized Common Law understandings similar 
to those James Otis relied on during the 1760s when protesting 
general warrants. 
Those Americans who defended judicial review immediately 
after the Constitution was drafted insisted that popular 
sovereignty justified the judicial power to declare laws 
unconstitutional. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78 declared: 
“Nor does this conclusion” that courts have the power to declare 
legislation unconstitutional  
by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the 
legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people 
is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, 
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the 
people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be 
governed by the latter rather than the former.33  
St. George Tucker, in his American edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, reached the same conclusion. “[I]n America,” he 
pointed out, “the constitutions, both of the individual states, and 
of the federal government, being acts of the people, and not of the 
government . . . the legislature can possess, no power, or 
obligation over the other branches of government, in any case, 
where the principles of the Constitution, may be in any degree 
infringed by an acquiescence under the authority of the legislative 
department.”34 John Marshall adopted this popular sovereign 
justification for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison. The first 
premise of his opinion was “That the people have an original right 
to establish for their future government, such principles as in their 
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, 
on which the whole American fabric has been erected.”35 
Judicial power in the United Kingdom is as rooted in a theory 
of sovereignty. Blackstone invoked parliamentary sovereignty 
when denying the power of judicial or other institutions to declare 
unconstitutional acts of Parliament. His Commentaries 
maintained, 
The power of parliament . . . is so transcendent and absolute 
 
 33. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS 467–68 (1961). 
 34. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES AND 
REFERENCES TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS; OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES; AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 91 n.20 (1803). 
 35. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
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that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons without 
any bounds . . . . It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority 
in the making, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and 
expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible 
denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, 
maritime, or crime; this being the place where that absolute 
despotic power,36 which must, in all governments, reside 
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these 
kingdoms.37 
This conception of parliamentary sovereign explains the English 
judicial practice of ultra vires. Courts in the United Kingdom may 
strike down administrative and executive decisions that they 
conclude are not warranted by parliamentary legislation, but they 
have no power to strike down legislative actions they believe 
inconsistent with the English Constitution.38 
The justices in the Ship-Money majority inverted 
Blackstone’s analysis of judicial power and sovereignty. Rather 
than locate sovereignty in Parliament, the justices located 
sovereignty in the King. Sir John Finch declared, “Certainly there 
was a king before a parliament, for how else could there be an 
assembly of king, lords and commons? And then what sovereignty 
was there in the kingdom but this?”39 Three conclusions followed 
from this assertion of regal sovereignty. First, the King had the 
power to determine when the kingdom was in sufficient danger to 
require revenue to be collected without parliamentary consent. 
Finch maintained, “the law that hath given the interest and 
sovereignty of defending and governing the kingdom to the king, 
doth also give the king power to charge his subjects for the 
necessary defence and good thereof.”40 Second, judges could 
strike down any parliamentary enactment that interfered with this 
sovereign prerogative. As noted above, Finch’s opinion insisted, 
“No act of parliament can bar a king of his regality, as that no 
 
 36. At this point in his edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries, Tucker added a 
footnote stating, “In the United States this absolute power is not delegated to the 
government: it remains with the people . . .”; TUCKER, supra note 34, at 160 n.21. 
 37. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 156 
(1765). 
 38. For a good discussion of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial power in the 
United Kingdom, see Lori Ringhand, Fig Leaves, Fairy Tales, and Constitutional 
Foundations: Debating Judicial Review in Britain, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865 
(2005). 
 39. Ship-Money, 3 Howell’s State Trials at 1226 (opinion of Finch, J.). 
 40. Id. 
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lands should hold of him; or bar him of the allegiance of his 
subjects; or the relative on his part, as trust and power to defend 
his people: therefore acts of parliament to take away his royal 
power in the defence of his kingdom, are void.”41 Third, royal 
edicts were the law of the land. Berkley declared, “The law is of 
itself an old and trusty servant of the king’s; it is his instrument or 
means which he useth to govern his people by.—I never read or 
heard, that Lex was Rex, but it is common and most true, that Rex 
is Lex.”42 
The dissenting opinions in Ship-Money did not ground 
judicial power to strike down a regal act on a theory of 
parliamentary or any other form of sovereignty. Hutton rejected 
both parliamentary and royal sovereignty when he insisted that 
the law of the land forbade kings from raising revenue without 
parliamentary consent and forbade Parliament from interfering 
with royal efforts to defend the kingdom.43 Instead, the dissents 
appear to have grounded judicial authority in Common Law 
practice. Parliamentary “sovereignty” was limited to those 
matters the Common Law and traditional practice entrusted to 
the national legislature. Royal sovereignty was limited to those 
matters the Common Law and traditional practice entrusted to 
the King. The judiciary, the dissenting opinions in Ship-Money 
implied, determined how the common law and traditional practice 
balanced power between Parliament and the King. 
The dissenting opinions in Ship-Money cast new light on the 
debate over whether Bonham’s Case belongs in the canon of 
judicial review. Conventional wisdom regarded Bonham’s Case as 
an important precedent for colonial calls for and early state 
exercises of judicial power.44 A revisionist literature developed in 
the mid-twentieth century suggesting that Coke’s claim that “the 
common law will controul Acts of Parliament”45 is an assertion 
about principles of statutory interpretation rather than about the 
structure of the legal hierarchy.46 James Otis was inventing a new 
tradition rather than reviving earlier practice, in this view, when 
 
 41. Id. at 1235. 
 42. Id. at 1098 (opinion of Berkley, J.). 
 43. See id. at 1191 (opinion of Hutton, J.).  
 44. See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 30, 61–68 (1926). 
 45. Bonham’s Case, 77 English Reports at 652. 
 46. See J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 35 (1955). Whittington takes this view (p. 40). 
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he cited Bonham’s Case for the proposition that “the acts of 
Parliament against natural equity are void”47 and called on courts 
to ignore legislation authorizing writs of assistance. The 
revisionist literature seems plausible because few instances 
appear to exist where English judges based decisions on 
constitutional norms. If Bonham’s Case is an extreme outlier on a 
traditional reading, then the traditional reading may be wrong. 
The Ship-Money dissents provide a missing link between 
Bonham’s Case and Otis’ claim that “An act against the 
constitution is void,”48 suggesting far greater continuity between 
English fundamental law jurisprudence of the seventeenth 
century and colonial fundamental law jurisprudence of the 
eighteenth century than acknowledged by Bonham’s Case 
revisionists. Crooke’s claim in his dissenting opinion that the Ship-
Money excise “is against the common law of the land”49 echoes 
both Bonham’s Case and Otis. Douglas Edlin details how many 
English judges during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
remained faithful to this common law practice. Prominent judges, 
he details, understood the “common law [as] on ongoing 
enterprise of human reason, conceived as practical, ‘artificial’ 
reason. So any law that conflicts with reason controverts the 
common law.”50 Several important Supreme Court opinions in the 
early republic continued this fundamental law practice. Justice 
Samuel Chase, in Calder v. Bull, asserted that “general principles 
of law and reason” justified striking down legislation inconsistent 
with “free republican governments.”51 Chief Justice Marshall 
insisted that “general principles which are common to our free 
institutions” provided an alternate ground for his ruling in 
Fletcher v. Peck that states could not rescind land grants.52 Justice 
William Johnson based his concurring opinion in that case on “the 
reason and nature of things: a principle which will impose laws 
even on the deity.”53 
 
 47. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED 
72 (1764). 
 48. 2 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 525 (1865) (quoting Otis). 
 49. Ship-Money, 3 Howell’s State Trials at 1129 (opinion of Crooke, J.). 
 50. DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, JUDGES AND UNJUST LAWS: COMMON LAW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 (2008). 
 51. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388, 389 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 52. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 139 (1810). 
 53. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 143 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
35.1 GRABER 6/19/2020 11:55 AM 
60 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 35:47 
 
The Ship-Money opinions suggest two paths to the American 
practice of judicial review. The first runs through the majority 
opinions in Ship-Money to Blackstone to Federalist 78 and 
Marbury v. Madison. This path treats judicial review as protecting 
sovereign power, whether that sovereign be the King, the national 
legislature or the people. Judicial review maintains the commands 
of the sovereign power against any institution that implicitly 
transgresses that authority. The second path runs through 
Bonham’s Case to the dissenting opinions in Ship-Money to James 
Otis to the Chase opinion in Calder and the judicial opinions in 
Fletcher. This path treats judicial review as protecting the 
fundamental law of a regime, regime principles that may or may 
not be written down in a constitutional text. Judicial review 
maintains longstanding fundamental principles against transient 
efforts to challenge those norms. Both paths continue to structure 
American constitutionalism. Robert McCloskey’s classic The 
American Supreme Court speaks of “the devotion of Americans 
to both popular sovereignty and fundamental law.”54 
III. SHIP-MONEY AND THE PRACTICE  
OF JUDICIAL POWER 
Ship-Money teaches as important if not more important 
lessons about the practice of judicial power. While far more 
research is necessary, English constitutional history suggests that 
the United Kingdom did not adopt parliamentary supremacy 
because, after centuries of contemplation, crucial English elites 
became convinced of the theoretical virtues of that allocation of 
constitutional authority. The English courts chose the wrong side 
in the English Civil War. Seventeenth-century English 
revolutionaries identified courts with the royal power the justices 
attempted to preserve. As Parliament struggled to tame royal 
power, part of the taming was also a taming of a court system 
perceived as a natural ally of royal power. Henry Parker’s The 
Case of Shipmoney, published in 1640,55 was one of the first 
documents in English constitutional history to champion 
 
 54. ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 8 (6th ed., 2016). 
McCloskey thought judges responsible for upholding the fundamental law commitments 
of democratic constitutionalism and elected officials responsible for upholding the popular 
sovereignty commitment of democratic constitutionalism. Id. at. 6–8. As discussed, 
however, judicial review reflects both commitments.  
 55. HENRY PARKER, THE CASE OF SHIPMONY BRIEFLY DISCOURSED, ACCORDING 
TO THE GROUNDS OF LAW, POLICY, AND CONSCIENCE (1976) [1640]. 
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parliamentary supremacy.56 Had the justices ruled against Charles 
I, the course of English constitutional history might have changed. 
The rise of parliamentary supremacy in England adds an 
important codicil to Professor Ran Hirschl’s theory of hegemonic 
preservation. Hirschl observes that courts gain power in many 
regimes when weakened majority coalitions have reason to 
empower the judiciary as a bulwark against rising threats to their 
rule. “[W]hen their policy preferences have been, or are likely to 
be, increasingly challenged in majoritarian decision-making 
arenas,” he maintains, “elites that possess disproportionate access 
to, and influence over, the legal arena may initiate a constitutional 
entrenchment of rights and judicial review in order to transfer 
power to supreme courts.”57 Jefferson’s observation in 1801 that 
“the Federalists have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold . . . 
and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be 
beaten down and erased”58 could have been said of a great many 
regimes, including Stuart England, with only a change in the 
proper nouns. Ship-Money highlights how one practical problem 
with hegemonic preservation is that rising political forces will 
identify courts with the partisan forces that have empowered the 
judiciary. If those hegemons are toppled too quickly, the court 
may be toppled as well. Sometimes, as in contemporary Poland, 
the new regime replaces the old justices with newer justices allied 
with the regime.59 The parliamentarians who triumphed in the 
English Civil War, recognizing the historical alliance of judges 
with the Crown, chose to abandon judicial review entirely, at least 
judicial review of parliamentary legislation. The benefits of 
hegemonic preservation, the Stuart and other examples suggest, 
may be transient. The cost to the initial hegemons may be far 
more significant. 
Ship-Money helps explain the rise of judicial review in the 
United States. Scholars generally agree that Federalists were 
committed to increasing executive power, with disputes largely 
over the degree to which Federalists wanted a stronger executive 
than their anti-Federalist rivals.60 A strengthened judiciary, the 
 
 56. See Michael Mendle, The Ship Money Case, the Case of Shipmoney, and the 
Development of Henry Parker’s Parliamentary Absolutism, 32 HIST. J. 513 (1989). 
 57. HIRSCHL, supra note 15, at 12. 
 58. 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 302 (1902) (in 
a letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Dickinson, December 19, 1804). 
 59. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019). 
 60. For the most recent entry in this debate, see ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST 
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English experience taught the framers, went hand-in-hand with a 
strengthened judiciary. The Virginia Plan proposed a council of 
revision composed of executive and judicial branch officials 
authorized to reject federal legislation.61 That Council was 
rejected, but Federalists understood courts as far more closely 
allied with executive power than with legislative power. Federalist 
78 indicated that courts would be toothless unless their decisions 
met with executive approval. Hamilton famously stated that the 
judiciary “may be truly said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, 
but merely judgment,” to which he added the less well-known 
point: “and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive 
arm even for the efficacy of judgment.”62 
Whittington’s Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy 
details the special relationship between courts and executives 
throughout American history. That work details how 
“[p]residents and political leaders have generally preferred that 
the Court take the responsibility for securing constitutional 
fidelity.”63 Presidents in times of normal constitutional politics 
“place like-minded judges on the bench”64 as useful means for 
“regime elaboration and enforcement,”65 particularly “against 
constitutional outliers”66 in states controlled by factions that are 
in the national minority. Presidents who confront a hostile 
Congress may find promoting judicial power the lesser of two 
evils. Whittington points out: “In a hostile political environment, 
the law and the judiciary may be the best defense that a president 
has.”67 Clashes between the White House and the Marble Palace 
tend to occur only during those rare moments in history when a 
new coalition has taken control of the elected branches of 
government, but the older justices have not yet left the bench.68 
Repugnant Laws tells the story of a chastened court that 
learned the political lesson of Ship-Money. Supreme Court 
 
REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (2014). 
 61. See 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
21 (rev. ed., 1966). 
 62. HAMILTON, MADISON & JAY, supra note 29, at 465. 
 63. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: 
THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY XI (2007).  
 64. Id. at 87. 
 65. Id. at 117. 
 66. Id. at 105 
 67. Id. at 166–167. 
 68. See id. at XI. 
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justices in the United States from John Marshall to John Roberts 
have generally avoided tangling with powerful forces in American 
politics. Whittington points out, “Through . . . low-profile and 
routine cases, the Court has established itself as a constitutional 
actor on the national stage” (p. 294). The justices when wielding 
judicial power in more high-profile and extraordinary cases have 
been supported by powerful officials whose power, more often 
than not, proved more enduring than that of Charles I. “When the 
Court intervenes to vindicate . . . principles against an errant 
legislature,” Repugnant Laws concludes, “it is often doing the 
political work that political leaders want it to do” (p. 314). This 
may not be the heroic judiciary imagined by Ronald Dworkin69 
and sought by the Ship-Money majority, but what Whittington 
brilliantly describes is the judicial reality of a tribunal that has 
survived and thrived for more than two hundred years. 
  
 
 69. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 69–71 (1985) (describing the 
Supreme Court as the “forum of principle”). 
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